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I. INTRODUCTION
The Faces of Justice and State Authority describes and analyzes proce-
dural structures, principles, and rules from an encompassing, comparative
perspective. The work considers relationships between procedural forms
or styles and both the structures of governmental authority and the pol-
ity's view of the state's role. The author brings to the work a broad and
deep knowledge of procedural systems and arrangements-past and con-
temporary-and a thoughtful concern for interactions between theory and
practice.
For the student of comparative procedure-civil as well as crimi-
nal-Professor Damaka's book makes at least two important contribu-
tions. First, it provides an analytical framework within which procedural
systems that present very different features can be meaningfully com-
pared. This approach to procedural arrangements advances our under-
standing of the extent to which procedural styles and practices are prod-
ucts of a society's particular governmental structure and political and
economic views. In addition, Professor Dama~ka provides a context and a
basis for a revealing discussion of the genesis and functioning of particular
procedural features, such as the varying ways in which cause material is
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gathered for presentation to the adjudicator and the extent to which the
adjudicator directs and controls the dispute-resolution process.
The book argues that in fundamental respects all procedural systems
are shaped by two ranges of considerations: (1) whether the officialdom of
the legal order in question is basically hierarchical or coordinate in form
and (2) whether the goal of justice is seen as the implementation of policy
(the activist state) or the resolution of conflict (the reactive state). Theoret-
ically, these two ranges of considerations allow for four paradigms: (1)
hierarchical-authority and policy-implementation; (2) hierarchical-
authority and conflict-resolution; (3) coordinate-authority and policy-
implementation; and (4) coordinate-authority and conflict-resolution.1
Certain procedural characteristics reflect both components of a given par-
adigm; other characteristics are attributable to only one component. The
most marked differences in procedural arrangements will occur in systems
which derive, respectively, from the first and the fourth paradigms. How-
ever, important similarities may exist in procedural systems related to sig-
nificantly different paradigms. In such cases, one must look to historical
considerations for explanation and understanding.
II. STRUCTURES OF AUTHORITY
Professor Damaka first discusses the organization of adjudicatory au-
thority. He contrasts the hierarchical and coordinate ideals and explores
the procedural implications of each ideal form. For each, three pairs of
elements are decisive: (1) whether those who operate the system are pro-
fessional, permanent officials or untrained, transitory personnel; (2)
whether the system's personnel are organized into a strict hierarchy; and
(3) whether decisions are rendered pursuant to "technical" standards or to
"undifferentiated or general community norms."2 The hierarchical ideal
of officialdom, Professor Dama~ka argues, is embodied in a system
marked by professional officials who are organized in a strict hierarchy
and who render decisions according to technical standards. The coordinate
ideal, on the other hand, encourages reliance on lay officials, horizontal
distribution of authority, and recourse to standards of substantive justice
in deciding controversies.$ While these neat patterns are not characteristic
of all actual systems, they do provide a convenient classificatory mecha-
nism. The models are particularly useful because, in the author's view,
"To the extent to which the organization of judicial authority influences
the design of the legal process, the hierarchical and the coordinate ideals
• . . offer a convenient perspective upon the always intriguing, never fully






grasped contrast between Continental and Anglo-American styles of ad-
ministering justice."" Against this theoretical background, Professor
Damaka discusses briefly and in historical context Continental European
and Anglo-American administrations of justice. He concludes that the for-
mer has close affinities to the hierarchical, the latter to the coordinate
ideal. These affinities are seen to generate and sustain characteristics con-
genial to the relevant ideal form. "Reciprocities between procedural au-
thority and procedural form . . .[are then] explored in more systematic
fashion."'
The problem posed is "[w]hat features of the legal process, or elements
of its design, can be attributed to specific characteristics of hierarchical
and coordinate organizations? What bearing do attitudes prevailing in one
or another setting have on procedural form?"' In other words, what are
the procedural styles characteristic of each system?
For Professor Damaka, the hierarchical ideal implies the following
procedural arrangement:7 the availability of regular and comprehensive
hierarchical review; the primordial importance of the case file which con-
denses and abstracts the cause materials; piecemeal trials; the exclusivity
of the official process;8 and a desire to regulate the legal process to the
extent feasible by "an internally consistent network of unbending rules."9
The contrasting implications for procedural arrangements of the coordi-
nate ideal are the following:10 the concentrated trial, relatively little em-
phasis on regular appellate review, reliance on oral communication and
live testimony (rather than on a written record) and on private action,
especially in preparing material for consideration at trial, and trials sub-
ject to extensive technical regulation but with the adjudicator retaining
considerable discretion.
III. FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT
Having considered various connections "between the administration of
justice and the structure of authority," Professor Damaka discusses "how
different conceptions about the function of government can affect the
shape of the legal process.""' For purposes of this discussion he posits two
polar or ideal visions: the reactive state and the activist state.





8. This includes suspicion of pre-trial contact between lawyers and witnesses and of privately
retained experts. Id. at 53-54.
9. P. 54-55.
10. P. 57-66.
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which its citizens pursue their chosen goals. Its instruments must set
free spontaneous forces of social self-management. The state contem-
plates no notion of separate interest apart from social and individual
(private) interests; there are no inherent state problems, only social
and individual problems.12
The activist state, in contrast, "does much more than adopt a few propul-
sive policies and welfare programs. It espouses or strives toward a com-
prehensive theory of the good life and tries to use it as a basis for a con-
ceptually all-encompassing program of material and moral betterment of
its citizens."1
For the reactive state, "to administer justice is always to engage in dis-
pute resolution ..... " "Adjudicators merely preside over the disputa-
tion of the adverse parties and intervene in the process only insofar as
intervention is required to monitor and to ensure the fair disposition of
incidental controversies." 5 The lawsuit is seen as a symbolic contest in
which judges rely on counsel to develop legal arguments and supply au-
thority. Indeed,
the reactive state is never "inquisitive" about the true state of affairs
independently of the interaction of its citizens, even within those seg-
ments of reality that its citizens choose to bring before its courts as a
matter in dispute. The state has no interests to which private self-
governance should be sacrificed; individual autonomy is its highest
priority, and as a result, it places significant limits on the quest for
truth. Moreover, since only difficult cases are litigated, the
"truth"-no matter how conceived-tends to appear elusive and am-
biguous. Thus, inspired by the ideology of reactive government, the
conflict-solving process is indifferent to how it actually was ....
Having already accorded control over the factual parameters of the
lawsuit to the parties, it also permits them to take full charge of
proving the facts brought within these parameters."6
In strong contrast to the reactive state, "the activist state's conception of
law as an instrument for the realization of its policy makes the legal pro-
cess independent of dispute resolution."1 Accordingly, a dispute between
individuals may well be transformed in order to advance state policy effec-
tively. "[A]ctivist government has little reason to tailor a lawsuit to the
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personal disputes become the occasion for solving social problems revealed
by an individual controversy, and the official inquest characterizes the sys-
tem's procedural style. "The more fully a state realizes its activist poten-
tial, the narrower the sphere in which the administration of justice can be
understood as dispute resolution, and the more the legal process is pruned
of procedural forms inspired by the key image of a party-controlled con-
test."19 At the extreme, the system engenders "a pure investigative model
of the legal process." 20 Unlike their role in the conflict-solving type of
proceeding, private individuals or groups in the investigative model are
not autonomous shapers of procedure:21 "Ultimately, control over the fact-
finding process . . . [is] in the hands of state officials."'22 This control
need not, however, be exercised by the decision maker.23 Finally, "[t]he
readiness of an activist state to correct substantively faulty judgments is
coupled with a great reluctance to disturb substantively accurate decisions,
even if obtained through violation of procedural regulation."*2
Considering various procedural characteristics in light of the four para-
digms that result from juxtaposing the hierarchical and coordinate forms
of officialdom, on the one hand, and the reactive and the activist state, on
the other, Professor Damaka remarks that some features are implied by
both-and others by only one-of a given paradigm's elements. The latter
case produces a tension in the system. An example is seen in the hierar-
chical-authority/policy-implementing paradigm. An activist process tends
to favor citizen participation in accessory procedural roles; a hierarchical
officialdom, however, disfavors citizen participation, viewing it as "disrup-
tive of orderly and efficient performance of technical tasks."'2 5 Where such
tensions are present, procedural arrangements are inherently less stable
than where no tension exists. Since both elements of this paradigm sup-
port strong official control over the fact-finding process, the absence in the
system of such control is most unlikely.
IV. APPLICATION OF ANALYSIS TO ACTUAL PROCEDURAL SYSTEMS
In Chapter VI, "Authority and Types of Justice," Professor Dama~ka
discusses a variety of legal systems, historical as well as contemporary, in
terms of these four models. The discussion shows both the utility and the
limitations of an analysis that employs pure models to examine the com-
19. P. 87.
20. Id. A discussion of the characteristics of a mode of legal proceedings that is theoretically
appropriate for "The Policy-Implementing Type of Proceeding" is undertaken in Chapter V.
21. P. 152.
22. P. 162. State control can be exercised in various ways; in particular, it is not necessary "for
fact-finding to be structured and dominated by ... [those] in charge of rendering the decision on the
merits." Id.
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plex reality of human affairs. 6 Soviet criminal process is presented as "a
pronouncedly activist and hierarchical system";27 the limiting case of this
type of system is, however, China's criminal process during the period of
the Cultural Revolution.28 The civil process of absolutist Prussia"9 and of
the USSR30 provide further, but more muted, examples of the policy-
implementing process of hierarchical officialdom in action.
Two models of the conflict-solving process are then considered: the first
involving hierarchical officialdom,31 the second involving coordinate offi-
cialdom.82 Here the author contrasts historical and contemporary forms of
Continental European civil procedure with their Anglo-American ana-
logues. The characteristic arrangements of Continental European proce-
dure can be understood as reflecting the place of hierarchical officialdom
in these systems. On the other hand, the tradition and present form of
coordinate officialdom decisively shape Anglo-American procedure.
Chapter VI concludes with a discussion of a type of procedure that has
far fewer historical or contemporary expressions than any of the other
types analyzed: the policy-implementing process of coordinate official-
dom." Drawing upon Anglo-American systems for examples of this
model, Professor Damalka examines such historical forms as the self-
informing jury, investigation and adjudication by justices of the peace, the
grand jury, and the criminal process at assizes. 4 Several contemporary
phenomena are considered and their affinities with the policy-
implementing/coordinate-officialdom paradigm discussed; these include
the role of so-called "private attorneys general," the use by federal judges
in the United States of "structural" injunctions to take over the direction
and management of prisons, schools, and other public institutions, and the
rise of so-called public interest litigation. 5
V. METHODOLOGICAL AND ANALYTICAL REFLECTIONS
Few scholars could bring to these methodological and comparative tasks
such a combination of historical and contemporary learning. Certainly in
the English language no analogous attempt to approach procedural sys-
tems in comparative terms has ever been made. Damaka's learning en-
compasses civil as well as criminal procedure and goes beyond the two
26. See p. 241-42.
27. P. 198.
28. See p. 198-99.
29. See p. 201-02.
30. See p. 202-04.
31. See p. 205-14.
32. See p. 214-26.
33. See p. 226-39.
34. See p. 228-31.




great western legal traditions-the common law and the civil law-to in-
clude the experience of Soviet Russia and the People's Republic of China.
The Faces ofJustice and State Authority is an excellent, ground-breaking
work.
Doubtless those who are specialists in given historical or contemporary
systems of civil or criminal procedure can fault Professor Dama~ka on this
or that detail. Of more interest and importance, however, are difficulties
jurists may have with the book's methodology and general analysis. Three
questions respecting the application to civil procedure 6 of the book's
methodology and general analysis occur to this reviewer. In the first place,
are there procedural policies that require attention in any procedural sys-
tem and whose formative force does not turn directly on any of the ele-
ments that determine Professor Dama~ka's procedural paradigms? Sec-
ond, are there discrete institutional characteristics, compatible with-but
not necessarily entailed by-these paradigms, that significantly shape sys-
tems of civil procedure? Third, for American civil procedure, is not the
decisive feature the use of untrained, transitory personnel-the
jury-rather than the assertedly coordinate nature of procedural official-
dom? And is the jury's presence in the final analysis a historical accident
in the sense that the institution does not derive from thinking about the
structure of procedural officialdom?
A. Universal Procedural Policies
The first procedural policy that strikes one as a relatively independent
force operating in all four paradigms is that of reasonable expedition
in-depending on the paradigm-implementing policy or resolving con-
flict. Of course, what is considered reasonable expedition is, within limits,
influenced by a procedural system's structure and goals. Structural consid-
erations can, moreover, be decisive of the phase of the proceedings in
which the problem is addressed. For example, during concentrated (or
single-episode) first-instance proceedings, delay resulting from party ma-
neuvers or procrastination3 7 is unlikely to be a serious problem; instead,
the problem is endemic to the pre-trial phase. Conversely, where first-
instance proceedings are discontinuous or episodic, the problem of delay
centers on the trial stage.3 8
The point is that concern for delay in itself brings about institutional
36. Having never worked with comparative criminal procedure, this reviewer is not in a position
to opine about possible difficulties in the criminal area.
37. Delay due to inadequate staffing of the system is a different matter, of course. But the reme-
dies are more clear-cut: either change the substantive or procedural law to make more efficient use of
existing faculties and personnel or increase the number of personnel.
38. See A. von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of the Concen-
trated Trial. Comparative Remarks, in 2 EUROPXISCHES RECHTSDENKEN IN GESCHICHTE UND
GFENWART 361, 367-70 (N. Horn ed. 1982); A. VON MEHRFN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW
SYSTEM 207-08 (2d ed. 1977).
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accommodations that may be in tension with the procedural arrangements
described in Professor Dama~ka's paradigms. For example, dissatisfaction
with delay fueled the reform of the German Code of Civil Procedure,
which produced important amendments that came into force on January
1, 1975, and July 1, 1977.11 In first-instance proceedings, these amend-
ments seek, above all else, to concentrate the trial as much as possible
within the general framework of a discontinuous procedure. In German
first-instance proceedings, the policy of reasonable expedition is thus in
tension with the implication of the conflict-solving/hierarchical-authority
model within which Professor Damaka locates Continental European
civil procedure. The German reforms impose a procedural duty on each
party to present his case as promptly and completely as possible. Under
the Zivilprozessordnung, this duty is sanctioned by the court's power to
exclude claims, defenses, and cause material if "in the court's opinion the
ultimate disposition of the controversy would be delayed by admitting the
matter in question and the delay was due to gross negligence."4 Signifi-
cant discretion is thus exercised by the court of first instance. Further-
more, as a result of the new amendments, where the court of first instance
excludes material, the excluded material is no longer admissible on appeal
(Berufung)-even though, in principle, appeal permits a full retrying of
the case, including the introduction of new evidence.4 The procedural
policy of reasonable expedition thus seems a formative force that is not
entirely captured by Professor Damaka's paradigms; on occasion, the pol-
icy pushes a procedural system in directions other than those suggested by
the relevant paradigm.
Another fundamental procedural policy-that which disfavors sur-
prise-requires that whoever is charged with gathering the materials on
the basis of which the adjudicator will decide be in a position to do a
reasonably thorough job. Regardless of the system in question, this proce-
dural policy finds expression in one of two basic ways: either (1) full
preparation is essentially completed before presentation to the adjudicator
or (2) the presentation is susceptible to postponements and extensions as
new factual allegations or issues arise in its course. Within each of these
two basic approaches, several variations are possible. For example, exten-
sive pleadings by each party can be required and continued until every
point of agreement and disagreement between the parties has emerged.
Alternatively, the pleading process can be abbreviated and arrangements
provided whereby those charged with gathering the cause materials can
39. See A. von Mehren, supra note 38, at 370.
40. ZPO § 296(2) (1985): "[W]enn ihre Zulassung nach der freien Uberzeugung des Gerichts die
Erledigung des Rechtsstreits verz5gern wfirde und die Versp~tung auf grober Nachlassigkeit beruht."
41. Section 528(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure now provides that "Angriffs- und Verteidi-
gungsmittel, die im ersten Rechtszug zu Recht zurckgewiesen worden sind, bleiben ausgeschlossen."




familiarize themselves thoroughly with the matter before presentation to
the adjudicator begins. In contemporary American civil procedure, the lat-
ter approach has been used and provision is made for elaborate pretrial
interrogatory and discovery procedures.
A system that does not accommodate the policy in favor of expeditious-
ness by arrangements that operate before the presentation to the adjudica-
tor begins requires accommodations that take hold during the presentation
itself. Postponements and extensions of the presentation become inevitable;
a discontinuous trial cannot be avoided.
All solutions to what is usually called the problem of surprise carry
certain institutional advantages and disadvantages. For example, reliance
on pretrial investigatory procedures such as interrogatories and discovery
at the stage of presentation to the adjudicator both enhances the position
of those who have prepared the case and encourages a passive role for the
adjudicator. Conversely, where the problem of surprise is dealt with after
the presentation of the 'matter to the adjudicator has begun, he need not
necessarily remain passive. Indeed, because surprise now tends to become
entangled with delay, the adjudicator's position tends to be more pivotal.
Here again, as in the case of the delay problem, formative forces are set in
motion whose sources lie, at least in some measure, outside Professor
Dam~ska's paradigms.
B. Institutional Characteristics
If universal procedural policies shape procedural systems, so too do par-
ticular institutional characteristics. Thus, many significant aspects of first-
instance civil procedure can be viewed as depending upon whether the
presentation of the cause to the adjudicator is concentrated or discontinu-
ous.42 In a procedural system that uses a concentrated trial, the delay
problem arises not at the trial stage, but prior to trial. Specific pressures
that have important effects on procedural arrangements operate in such
systems; in particular, as has already been remarked, the surprise problem
can be handled only by arrangements that take hold before the presenta-
tion of the cause materials to the adjudicator has begun.
Other options for dealing with surprise are available to a system accus-
tomed to the discontinuous trial. Such systems can deal with surprise ei-
ther by adopting arrangements that attach at the pretrial stage or, alterna-
tively, by simply taking advantage of the discontinuous nature of the
system's trial phase. Indeed, an interaction between the procedural policy
against surprise and the discontinuous nature of the trial is normal; to
avoid surprise, the trial must be discontinuous and, therefore, there is no
42. See generally A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 38, at 203-08.
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need to develop alternative approaches to the surprise problem with their
attendant complications and difficulties.
C. Anglo-American Civil Procedure
There remains the question whether, for Anglo-American civil proce-
dure, the coordinate nature of procedural authority is as clear and decisive
as Professor Damaka suggests. From a contemporary American perspec-
tive, only one of the three elements that characterize coordinate authority,
the important reliance on occasional, ad hoc adjudicators (the jury), seems
pervasive and of decisive importance. The reliance on such adjudicators
clearly requires practices and arrangements that would not be necessary if
all first-instance proceedings in the American system were conducted
before judges alone. Use of a jury system requires concentration of the
trial phase; an occasional, ad hoc adjudicator simply cannot be available
for episodic proceedings that occur from time to time over an extended
period. Likewise, if a jury system is to remain faithful to its animating
philosophy, first-level appellate review cannot undertake a full redoing of
the matter except by impanelling a jury. The practical difficulties and
costs that would be involved are, of course, far too great for such an ar-
rangement to be feasible. The more restrictive character of the first level
of appellate review in the United States than in many Continental Euro-
pean systems is explained quite as well by this reality as by different
attitudes towards hierarchy.
In this connection a final observation can be ventured: In large
measure, the coordinate nature of contemporary American procedural offi-
cialdom can be understood as entailed by the use of juries; however,
neither the jury's emergence nor its continued existence seems to be rooted
in society's adherence to the coordinate ideal. Theories and values, on the
one hand, and social and institutional arrangements and practices, on the
other, always interact. But the influence that one side of the equation has
over the other varies in the course of history considerably. In the case of
first-instance proceedings in the United States, arguably the institutional
fact of the jury-rather than the attractiveness of coordinate values-has
been, and remains, decisive.
To the extent that these criticisms have merit, they suggest that Profes-
sor Damaka's approach underestimates the separate and independent im-
portance of certain procedural policies and institutions. His paradigms
may well explain the general contours that procedural systems exhibit.
However, the range of possible variation remains considerable. Particu-
larly in comparing systems produced by juridical traditions that are cul-
turally and historically linked, Professor Dama~ka's approach may attri-
bute too little independent significance and force to procedural policies
against delay and surprise and may underplay the importance of discrete
[Vol. 97: 341
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institutions such as the concentrated or episodic nature of first-instance
proceedings.

